Shifting Armington Trade Preferences: A re-examination of the Mercosur-EU negotiations by Philippidis, George et al.
 1
                                          
 
 
 
 
 
Shifting Armington Trade Preferences: 
A re-examination of the Mercosur-EU negotiations 
 
 
Philippidis, G.a, Resano, H.b, Sanjuán, A.I.b, Bourne, M.b & Kitou, E.c 
 
 
a Aragonese Agency for Research and Develñopment (ARAID), Centre for Agro-Food 
Research and Technology (CITA) – Spain. 
 
b Unit of Agro-Food Economics and Natural Rsources, Centre for Agro-Food Research and 
Technology (CITA) – Spain. 
 
c Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (Defra) – United Kingdom 
 
 
 
A paper presented for the 15th Annual Conference on Global Economic Analysis, 
Geneva, Switzerland, June 27th – 29th, 2012 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(This work is still under review: Please do not quote) 
 
 
 2
Shifting Armington Trade Preferences: 
A re-examination of the Mercosur-EU negotiations 
1. Introduction 
A decade has passed and a successful outcome to the Doha Development Round 
remains as uncertain as ever, leading some trade partners to seek out ‘second best’ bilateral 
preferential trade agreements (PTAs). The, European Union (EU), for example, has forged 
recent PTAs with South Korea, Columbia and Peru, whilst negotiations with Mercosur, which 
began in 1999, have floundered. In part, this was out of respect for the ongoing multilateral 
talks, but it also reflected a frustration related to the perceived intransigence of both sides to 
broker a deal. As a result, discussions were formally suspended in 2004, although a détente in 
relations would later bridge the way for a re-launch of the negotiations at the EU-Latin 
America and Caribbean Madrid summit in May 2010.  
A review of the literature reveals various examples of computable general equilibrium 
(CGE) assessments of the EU-Mercosur negotiations (e.g., Diao et al., 2003; Philippidis and 
Sanjuán, 2007; Burrell, 2011). Indeed, with significant improvements in computational 
facility and access to the well known Global Trade Analysis Project (GTAP) database, 
deterministic neoclassical multi-region CGE models have become an accepted workhorse for 
assessing ex-ante trade led gains. The general consensus of this literature is that both the EU 
and Mercosur would witness real GDP gains (trade creation exceeds trade diversion), 
although the magnitude of these trade benefits is very much a function of the behavioural 
modifications within each study (i.e., economies of scale; trade led technology spillovers; 
non-tariff barrier estimates; capital accumulation etc.). 
A common characteristic of multi-region CGE models is the treatment of import 
demands employing the Armington (1969) assumption. As a departure from the neoclassical 
paradigm, this structural feature permits the empirical observation of intra-industry trade (i.e., 
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two-way trade in similar products), which at the level of aggregation inherent within the 
GTAP database, is considerable. In particular, characterising import demand by a 
‘convenient’ functional form1 (i.e., constant elasticity of substitution (CES)) captures 
horizontal product differentiation employing ‘exogenous’ considerations relating to region of 
origin; allows imperfect transmission between world and domestic prices; and offers 
analytical simplicity and computational tractability owing to its parsimonious structure.  
Unfortunately, owing to the degree of parametric uncertainty, this behavioural structure 
often leaves CGE model results open to criticisms of disproportionate terms of trade effects 
when examining tariff liberalisation scenarios (Boadway and Treddenick, 1978; Brown, 
1987).2 A further well known results bias, which constitutes the focus of the present study, is 
the ‘small share’ problem (Morkre and Tarr, 1993). In particular, the Armington treatment 
understates trade creation when the benchmark data import share is ‘small’. The policy 
implication is that tariff restricted competitive suppliers with small initial import shares do not 
witness the expected level of export growth in CGE liberalisation scenarios. There are a 
number of ad hoc solutions to the small share problem, although these only treat the 
symptoms whilst lacking any theoretical foundation. Furthermore, structural solutions (i.e., 
homogeneous product assumption, flexible functional forms) forgo the benefit of 
characterising intra-industry trade or place unreasonable parametric demands on a CGE model 
with global coverage.3  
As a promising alternative, Kuiper and van Tongeren (2006) propose the gravity 
specification. More specifically, ‘post-liberalisation’ import trade patterns based on 
econometric tariff parameter estimates are subsequently employed in CGE models by 
                                                 
1 The use of a convenient functions to specify import demands has implicit structural weaknesses (see Winters, 
1984; Alston et al., 1990). Nonetheless, modellers accept these restrictions since the econometric information 
required to support a more flexible treatment is not available for disaggregated global CGE treatments. 
2 The relationship between the size of the Armington substitution elasticities and the terms of trade effect is 
particularly complex. Zhang (2006) provides a useful empirical discussion on this topic. 
3 A comprehensive discussion of these issues can be found in Komorovska et al (2007) 
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‘shifting’ the preference parameter in the Armington demand functions. Importantly, the 
gravity specification is theoretically consistent with a CES import demand structure 
(Anderson and van Wincoop, 2003, 2004), whilst its ability to decompose trade 
restrictiveness into economic (i.e., tariffs, export subsidies) and non-economic (i.e., 
remoteness, cultural barriers etc.) considerations, permits the modeller to discriminate 
between trade flows that remain small after liberalisation and those where competitive trade 
led growth may potentially arise. Surprisingly, whilst gravity models have enjoyed a 
renaissance in the literature, to the best of our knowledge, there are very few gravity studies 
(De Frahan and Vancauteren, 2006; Kuiper and van Tongeren, 2006; Raimondi and Olper, 
2011) which attempt to estimate the trade restrictiveness of tariff barriers for a wide selection 
of agro-food sectors, whilst no known published studies extend this practise to disaggregated 
non agro-food sectors. Consequently, given the pervasiveness of the Armington assumption in 
global CGE assessments, the estimation and provision of publically available robust 
econometric estimates to correct this structural bias, constitutes a primary aim of this 
research.  
Accordingly, this study builds on the seminal work of Kuiper and van Tongeren (2006) 
in three ways. Firstly, Kuiper and Van Tongeren (2006) and subsequently Komorovska et al. 
(2007) restrict their analysis to cross section data (release 6 of the GTAP database), while this 
study applies panel data to better control for country heterogeneity. Secondly, a typical 
feature of large trade data sets is the existence of zero values. In common with (inter alia) 
Komorovska et al. (2007), this study employs the Poisson estimator, but also explores more 
flexible variants of count models (Burger et al. 2009). Thirdly, in addition to the 20 agro-food 
sectors examined in the aforementioned CGE studies, the current paper considers all 56 
tradable commodities in the GTAP database. To the best of our knowledge, this is the only 
panel gravity study which reconciles the methodological improvements of using zero-inflated 
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models with a disaggregated sector analysis. A comparison with previous work reveals that 
the statistical significance of our sectoral gravity equations and the theoretical consistency of 
(inter alia), tariff and subsidy parameter estimates with a priori expectations is greatly 
improved.  
In the second part of this study, estimated trade preference shifters are implemented into 
an agricultural variant of the GTAP CGE model to examine the revised pattern of trade gains 
from an EU-Mercosur PTA. Aside from its pertinence to global trade policy, EU-Mercosur 
trade relations also embody various ´small share’ examples due to the EU’s prohibitively high 
agro-food tariff regime. A comparison with a non-gravity baseline reveals important 
additional trade led gains in the Mercosur regions, with further increases in real economic 
growth of between 0.9% (Brazil) to 3.8% (Uruguay).  
The rest of this paper is structured as follows: Section two analyses the gravity 
specification and the use of count models. Section three presents the results of the gravity 
specification for each of the sectors. Section four describes the CGE model, the policy 
scenarios, the gravity implementation and the CGE model results. Section five concludes. 
2. The gravity specification 
2.1 Model developments4 
In its simplest form, the gravity model posits that trade between two countries is a 
positive function of GDP (i.e., economic ‘mass’) and a negative function of trade costs (i.e., 
distance). Empirical applications have extended this specification to encompass (inter alia) 
preferential trade (Kandogan, 2008; Martinez-Zarzoso et al., 2009; Foster et al., 2011; 
Hayakawa and Yamashita, 2011), contiguity (Bergstrand, 1985; Thoumi, 1989), common 
language and/or ex-colonial ties (e.g. Rose and van Wincoop, 2001), or even to cater for the 
effect of distance along different hemispheres as well as remoteness (Melitz, 2007). From an 
                                                 
4 Chapter five of Feenstra (2004) provides a comprehensive review of the theoretical and empirical development 
of the gravity equation 
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econometric standpoint, earlier studies favoured the use of an Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) 
log-linear specification. Subsequent literature (Santos Silva and Tenreyro, 2006; 2011) 
demonstrates that this estimator does not adequately cater for zero value observations, whilst 
the expected value of the log-linearized error will in general depend on the covariates and 
therefore lead to problems of heteroskedasticity. This leads Santos Silva and Tenreyro (2006; 
2011) to recommend the Poisson estimator, which belongs to the category of count models. 
This study further explores the potential of alternative count model specification, following 
closely the work by Burger et al. (2009). 
2.2. Methodology: Count models 
Trade observations are not pure count-, but rather non-negative continuous data. 
Notwtihstanding, the Poisson Maximum Likelihood estimator still provides consistent 
estimates (Woolridge, 2002; Burger et al., 2009), in which case it is referred to more precisely 
as the Poisson Pseudo-Maximum Likelihood (PML) estimator5. In the Poisson model, the 
occurrence of an event (i.e. the observed volume of trade between countries i and j) follows a 
Poisson distribution with density: 
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                                     (1) 
where μij is the rate parameter, which is a (exponential) function of the explanatory variables; 
the conditional mean of bilateral trade Xij is E[Xij] = μij and the variance Var[Xij] = μij. If the 
conditional variance exceeds the conditional mean, then there is over-dispersion, revealing the 
presence of unobserved heterogeneity caused by omitted variables (Burger et al., 2009). In 
this case, a Negative Binomial (NB) PML estimator is more advisable, as it relaxes the 
assumption of equi-dispersion. The NB model assumes that: Var[Xij] = μij + α μij2, with α 
                                                 
5 In the econometric literature the term Pseudo-Maximum Likelihood refers to estimating by Maximum 
Likelihood under the assumption that the specified density is not correct (Gourieoroux et al., 1984).  
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being the dispersion parameter; if α  equals zero the NB becomes a Poisson (Cameron and 
Trivedi, 1998). 
In those cases containing an excess of zeros (compared to what the Poisson or NB 
predict) the Zero Inflated Poisson (ZIP) PML and Zero Inflated Negative Binomial (ZINB) 
PML is recommended.6 Although ZIP and ZINB have been applied in a variety of fields 
including bio-diversity, medicine, manufacturing defects and economics, their application 
within the gravity literature (Burger et al., 2009) is rare. The zero-inflated models 
acknowledge that zeros may arise subject to two regimes. In the first regime, the outcome is 
recorded as a ‘false’ zero, which reflects a situation where two partners never trade in a 
specific sector due to, for example, significant geographical and/or cultural distances, or 
simply because of errors in data recording. In the second regime, a Poisson process (or 
‘Negative Binomial’) is assumed either in the case of a ‘true’ zero where trade could occur in 
the future subject to changing conditions (e.g., a reduction in transport costs; expansion of 
demand; trade liberalisation), or a non-zero trade observation.  
In the context of zero observations, Burger et al. (2009) consider the ZIP and ZINB 
treatment to be superior to other rival specifications, such as the Hurdle Poisson or Heckman 
selection models. For example, comparing with the Hurdle Poisson, the inflated model is 
richer as it distinguishes between false zeros; true zeros; and non-zero values. Similarly, in 
contrast to the Heckman selection model, the inflated count models avoid (i) the restrictions 
imposed by the normality assumption; (ii) the need for an instrument in the second stage of 
the Heckman model where the amount of trade is predicted; and (iii) the bias induced by the 
log-transformation also in the second stage of the Heckman model. 
2.3. Data and final model specification 
                                                 
6 Further detail on the ZIP and ZINB models is available in Cameron and Trivedi (1998) and Greene (2002).  
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Data for 2001 and 2004 on bilateral trade flows, ad-valorem applied rates (import tariffs 
and export refunds) for 56 commodities (Table 1) and GDP for 95 regions are taken from 
releases 6 (Dimaranan, 2006) and 7 (Narayanan and Walmsley, 2008) of the GTAP database 
yielding 17892 observations for each sector. The population data needed to calculate per 
capita income is obtained from the World Bank (2011). Bilateral distance, contiguity, 
common official language, colonial linkages data, and the latitudes needed to calculate the 
variable NoSo are taken from CEPII (2011). A panel is better equipped to mitigate 
endogeneity problems usually referred in the literature in relation to PTAs (Martínez-Zarzoso 
et al., 2009) and tariff rates (Komorovska et al., 2007; Philippidis and Sanjuán, 2007).7 
The final form of our gravity specification is presented in equation (2), where the sub-
index i and j refer to the exporter and importer, respectively, whilst t, refers to the year: 
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The gravity equation includes fixed effects for both time (Y2004) and country (exporter 
and importer) (Fi and Fj)8. The country fixed effects proxy the unobserved theoretical 
multilateral resistence terms posed by Anderson and van Wincoop (2003, 2004)9, while both, 
country and year fixed effects control for correlation between omitted and observed variables 
(Greene, 2002). The distance variable (Dist) is complemented by contiguity (Cont), location 
by hemisphere (NoSo) and remoteness (Remote) variables. The NoSo may mitigate the 
negative impact of distance when trade between hemispheres is due to different factor 
                                                 
7 Employing only a single year of data, the observation that ‘large’ agro-food net importers (i.e., the EU, USA) 
also impose high tariff barriers explains the perverse positive tariff coefficients found in previous empirical 
applications. 
8 In the final estimated model, however, some of the exporter fixed effects had to be dropped to avoid 
collinearity problems, in particular with export specific variables such as remoteness. 
9 Anderson and van Wincoop (2003, 2004) stress the importance of controlling for multilateral resistance terms 
arguing that trade between two regions depends on the bilateral barrier between them relative to the average 
trade barriers that both regions face with all their trading partners. 
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endowments and patterns of product specialization (Melitz, 2007), while Remote may also 
mitigate the distance effect due to the lack of large countries in the proximity with which to 
trade (Frankel, 1997). In terms of historical and cultural linkages, we include both common 
language (Lang) and colonial ties (Col) dummies, which are expected to have a non-negative 
effect. Additionally, membership of a PTA (PTA), the squared difference (SqIncome) (Linder 
hypothesis) and the product of GDPs (Gdp) in per capita GDPs are incorporated. 10 A positive 
PTA effect is expected, while a negative SqIncome impact would confirm the Linder 
hypothesis. Finally, bilateral import tariffs (Mt) and export subsidies (Xs) are inserted into the 
gravity regression. A full description of the explanatory variables is presented in Table 2. 
The estimated coefficients represent the percentage change in the conditional mean of 
trade resulting from a unit variation in the explanatory variable (Cameron and Trivedi, 1998). 
If the explanatory variable is expressed in logs, the coefficient can be interpreted directly as 
an elasticity; whilst in the case of a dummy variable, the exponential minus one multiplied by 
100 provides the percentage change in trade when the dummy changes from 0 to 1. Robust 
standard errors have been estimated using the White sandwich estimator of variance, and the 
econometric software STATA 8.0 has been applied in the estimation of all count models. 
3. Gravity model results 
Results of the estimation are presented in Table 3. In choosing between the four 
alternative models (Poisson, Negative Binomial, Zero Inflated Poisson and Zero Inflated 
Negative Binomial) for each of the 56 gravity models, two tests are conducted. The Vuong 
statistic (Vuong, 1989) is applied to compare the inflated versus the non-inflated versions 
(i.e., ZIP versus Poisson; and ZINB versus NB). Subsequently, the log-likelihood ratio (LR) 
statistic is used to test for the significance of the dispersion parameter (α). A significant 
                                                 
10 The Gdp coefficient is restricted to a value of 1 according to the theoretical model derived by Anderson and 
van Wincoop (2003). From an estimation perspective, the use of the bilateral product of GDP and the difference 
in per capita income reduces collinearity problems that may emerge between individual GDP (or per capita 
GDP) with country fixed effects. The Linder hypothesis posits that countries with similar per capita incomes 
have a greater tendency to engage in mutual trade 
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dispersion parameter favours the NB versus the Poisson model, or the ZINB versus the ZIP 
model. Neither test is adequate for comparing the Poisson vs. ZIB, or NB vs. ZIP, in which 
case, the model with the lowest Akaike Information Criteria (AIC) is selected (not shown), 
whilst the statistical significance of tariff and export refund coefficients also has an important 
bearing on final model choice.  
Focusing on tariff barriers (Mt), we observe that in almost all the regressions, ad 
valorem tariffs have the expected negative sign (Table 3). Comparing between the agro-food 
sectors where applied ad valorem tariff peaks are typically highest, plant fibres, livestock 
activities and dairy record the largest tariff coefficient estimates (i.e., the perceived sensitivity 
between tariff reductions and trade changes). For example, in the latter, trade rises by 1.931% 
in response to a 1% reduction in tariffs. In the non-food sectors, the sensitivity of trade to 
tariff rate changes is highest in the textiles and leather sectors; coal mining; refined petroleum 
and coal; and non ferrous metals. One sector (‘ely’) exhibits an unexpected positive but non-
significant sign, whilst five more sectors show insignificant ad valorem tariffs coefficients 
(‘osd’, ‘c_b’, ‘oil’, ‘gas’, ‘gdt’).11 In the data, raw sugar (c_b) is largely non-tradable, whilst 
the tariff coefficient on downstream tradable sugar (sgr) is significant. In the oilseeds sector, 
there is tariff escalation where protection of oilseeds imports by ‘large’ developed countries is 
typically low, whilst tariffs on oilseed products (i.e., ‘vol’, whose coefficient is found to be 
highly significant) are high.12  
Turning to the export refund coefficients, a positive and significant coefficient (Xs) is 
found in five of the 14 agro-food markets which employ export refunds (Table 3). 
Unexpectedly, a negative but non-significant effect is found in the cattle meat (cmt), and 
beverages and tobacco (b_t) sectors. We suggest that the degree of insignificance of export 
subsidies (vis-à-vis import tariffs) is a consequence of the fact that export refunds are a 
                                                 
11 Komorovska et al. (2007) also find insignificant tariff coefficients for oilseeds (osd) and raw sugar (c_b) 
12 Sarker and Jayasinghe (2007) also note that as the largest importer of oilseeds (soybean, rapeseed and 
sunflower) the EU market access has been tariff free since the Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture. 
 11
response to market conditions and therefore are not systematically employed year on year. In 
non-agro-food sectors, a positive and significant impact of export subsidies is found in 13 out 
of 20 sectors for which export subsidies are applied, while a priori an unexpected non-
significant and negative impact is found only in one sector: transport equipment (‘otn’). 
As expected, distance has a negative and significant impact on trade in almost every sector. 
The median parameter estimate is -0.762, which implies that in 50% of the sectors, trade 
increases by more than 0.762% when distance drops by 1%. Notwithstanding, when 
measuring distance North-South hemispheres a positive (although generally small) and 
significant effect is found in 18 sectors, whilst contrary to expectations, eight other sectors 
yield statistically significant negative effects, intensifying the already negative distance effect. 
In many sectors (27 in total) remoteness plays a significant positive role in explaining 
bilateral trade, with an associated median impact of 1.308. Nevertheless, a significant 
negative impact is also found in eight other sectors. Contiguity is also found to favour trade. 
In half of the sectors, the fact of sharing a border increases bilateral trade by 57.62%.  
Turning to our historical explanatory factors, language is statistically significant in only 
21 sectors, whilst colonial links are found to encourage greater bilateral trade in 39 sectors. In 
both cases, however, the median impact on trade is small (zero per cent in language, since 
positive and negative coefficients cancel each other out; 25.73 per cent for colonial ties). 
Membership of a preferential trade agreement (PTA) increases bilateral trade in most sectors 
(36), with particularly notable impacts in the three cereals sectors. On the other hand, in seven 
sectors, a statistically significant negative effect is recorded. Overall, the results indicate that 
the median impact on trade is 34.46%. Finally, Table 3 shows a significant Linder effect 
(SqIncome) in 12 sectors, four of which are in the agro-food industries.  
4. CGE model and experiments 
4.1 CGE model description and gravity implementation 
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The ‘standard’ comparative static GTAP model (Hertel, 1997) is demand driven, 
employing neo-classical optimisation to derive Hicksian consumer and intermediate demands. 
Regional utility is aggregated over non-homothetic private demands, public demands and 
savings (investment demand). Producers are perfectly competitive and exhibit constant 
returns to scale technology, with access to five factors of production. Both (skilled and 
unskilled) labour types and capital are fully mobile between sectors, whilst land (agriculture 
specific) and natural resources exhibit restricted mobility. Regional savings are collected by a 
fictitious ‘global bank’, which then assigns regional investments subject to a rate of return or 
a ‘fixed share rule. Once an endogenous/exogenous variable split is determined (‘closure’), 
exogenous policy shocks catalyse an interaction between economic agents, subject to a series 
of accounting identities and market clearing equations, which ensures a new (‘counterfactual’) 
general equilibrium solution. This study employs an agricultural variant of the standard 
GTAP model which shares a number of common features with the GTAP-AGR (Keeney and 
Hertel, 2005), whilst also explicitly incorporating EU common agricultural policy (CAP) 
mechanisms and an econometrically estimated land supply function by region.13  
Since the standard GTAP model is typically represented in linear (percentage change) 
form, Armington import demands of commodity ‘i’, from origin ‘r’ to destination ‘s’ are 
typically represented as: 
( )sisrisriMisisrisri pcapmcam ,,,,,,,,,, −−−+−= σ      (3) 
[ ]srisri
r
srisi apMSHRSpc ,,,,,,, −= ∑       (4) 
where mi,r,s are bilateral demands; mci,s is the import composite from all origin countries; pi,r,s 
is the (post-tariff) commodity market price; pci,s is the composite (or ‘weighted’) price of 
commodity ‘i’ across all origin countries; σ is the elasticity of substitution of commodity ‘i’ 
                                                 
13 The model is employed by the UK Ministry of Agriculture (DEFRA). Full documentation of the model 
extensions is available upon request. 
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between alternative origin routes. The composite import price of good ‘i’ in region ‘s’ is 
calculated as a weighted import share (MSHRS) index of individual import prices from origin 
‘r’. Thus, in linearised form, the small share problem manifests itself by the size of the 
coefficient ‘MSHRS’ in equation (4). If ‘MSHRS’ were tiny for a particular route of origin 
‘r’, significant (tariff induced) falls in ‘p’, coupled with a large trade elasticity (σ), will still 
only result in a small trade effect.14 
From a modelling perspective it is not practical to directly substitute the GTAP import 
shares in the benchmark data with equivalent post-liberalisation gravity predictions (GSHRS) 
since this would disrupt the internal consistency of the GTAP database. Kuiper and van 
Tongeren (2006) view the necessary change in import composition as akin to a change in 
‘import technology’. More specifically, an exogenous Hicks neutral technological shift 
variable for each bilateral route (ai,r,s) shifts the Armington import demand curve to mimic the 
composition of import trade shares predicted by the gravity model. Thus, a positive shock to 
the technology shifter reduces the ‘effective’ bilateral import price (i.e., pi,r,s – ai,r,s) and 
increases the effective quantity imported (i.e., mi,r,s + ai,r,s). To determine the magnitude of 
these shocks, it is assumed that the percentage change in the effective import price is based on 
the following identity: 
[ ] srisrisrisrisri pGSHRSapMSHRS ,,,,,,,,,, =−       (5) 
where GSHRS is the predicted bilateral gravity import share from removal of all tariffs 
between the EU the Mercosur. Rearranging: 
 sri
sri
sri
srisri pMSHRS
GSHRS
pa ,,
,,
,,
,,,, −=        (6) 
                                                 
14 Consider two MSHRS values of 0.99 (r=1) and 0.01 (r=2) in region ‘s’. Since pci,s ≈ pi,1,s, then under tariff 
liberalisation, pi,2,s would have to fall considerably more than pi,1,s to provoke any significant bilateral import 
demand response (i.e., the relative tariff along r=1 should be much higher than other import routes, whilst the σ 
parameter must also be highly responsive). Notwithstanding, even then, the percentage change in bilateral import 
value (-%ΔP x +%ΔM) may not increase significantly from such a small base. 
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Employing a first order linear price linkage assumption, the percentage change in the 
(post tariff) bilateral import price in destination ‘s’ reflects the percentage change in its 
applied tariff and (if present) the export subsidy in origin ‘r’.15 For example, a greater applied 
tariff reduction for a specific bilateral route is expected (a priori) to raise the corresponding 
gravity predicted import share, accompanied by a notable percentage drop in the bilateral 
import price. Accordingly, the prescribed (positive) shock to the technological shifter would 
be of a larger magnitude. 
4.2 Data aggregation, scenario design and closure  
Employing version 7.1 of the GTAP data (2004 benchmark), our study includes all 20 
GTAP agro-food sectors; textiles, light- and heavy-manufacturing, services and natural 
resources. For modelling purposes, the EU is split into four regions, although results are only 
presented for the bloc of 27. In addition, each of the four Mercosur members (Argentina, 
Brazil, Paraguay, Uruguay) are disaggregated; whilst residual trade flows are captured by the 
rest of the world (ROW) region. 
In our long run ‘baseline’, tariff shocks extend the single market to 27 EU members, 
whilst all tariffs between the EU and Mercosur are removed. Moreover, the importance of 
agro-food markets in our analysis warrants an explicit characterisation of the CAP reforms 
(i.e., intervention price reductions, abolition of set-aside, abolition of dairy and sugar quotas, 
single farm payment, CAP budget, modulation increases). Given the degree of uncertainty 
surrounding the Doha talks, whilst also with a view to isolating the policy shocks of interest, 
multilateral liberalisation shocks were not considered. A further ‘gravity’ scenario mimics the 
trade policy shocks of the baseline, with the addition of exogenous shocks to the 
                                                 
15 A reduction in an applied tariff (export subsidy) is expected to reduce (increase) the import price. Moreover, in 
those relevant cases where data are available, the size of the tariff reduction may also depend on the binding 
tariff overhang (in multilateral simulations) and sensitive product exceptions. 
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technological shift parameters.16 The model closure follows traditional neoclassical 
assumptions of flexible wages and long-run (exogenous) natural rates of employment. The 
capital market is characterised by a long run ‘steady-state’ Baldwin closure (Francois, 
1996),17 whilst regional land supply is subject to an econometrically estimated supply 
function. Unless otherwise stated, the results report the additional impacts of gravity 
compared with the baseline. 
4.3 CGE Results 
The GTAP version 7 data reveal that the EU imports €36,452 million from Mercosur 
(2004 prices), of which 40 per cent consists of highly protected agro-food trade (e.g., sugar, 
dairy, meat). Similarly, Mercosur imports €26,974 million from the EU, of which 98 per cent 
is non agro-food related. Comparing between both regions, the data suggests that Mercosur 
applied tariffs are between 10-20 per cent in non-food sectors, whilst corresponding EU 
applied tariffs are typically below 5 per cent. It is therefore not surprising that the baseline 
experiment shows improved agro-food production in Brazil (5.1%); Argentina (20.7%); 
Paraguay (14.0%) and Uruguay (10.7%); with a concomitant contraction in EU agro-food 
activity (-1.1%). Similarly, textiles, light- and heavy-manufacturing production in the EU rise 
0.7%, 0.2% and 0.3%, with concurrent contractions in Mercosur’s corresponding sectors. 
Owing to significant agro-food market access gains, real growth rises in Brazil (1.2%), 
Argentina (2.9%), Paraguay (3.7%) and Uruguay (3.2%), whilst the EU real growth estimate 
is muted (0.01%).18 
Comparing with this baseline, EU agrofood (non agro-food) imports from Mercosur rise 
(fall) a further 29.5 per cent (7.3 per cent), resulting in an overall fall of 16.4 per cent (results 
                                                 
16 Additional ancillary programs are written to calculate predicted trade flows under gravity for the 
regional/commodity aggregation of choice.  
17 Steady state implies that the rate of capital growth is just sufficient to replace depreciated capital. 
18 We do not show these results since other studies in the literature find a similar result (a useful review is given 
in section 2 of Burrell, 2011). The focus here is to examine the potential bias from additional gravity induced 
trade effects. 
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not shown). This leads to important EU import trade share changes, which are presented as 
percentages in Table 4 for the most affected sectors. The benchmark EU trade data for 
processed sugar show that Brazil and Paraguay have characteristically small shares (2.6% and 
0.1%, respectively) on account of the EU’s prohibitive tariff. In the baseline, these figures rise 
to 47.0% and 4.1%, respectively, whilst with gravity included, there is a further rise to 66.1% 
and 5.7%, respectively.19 Comparing between the baseline and gravity scenarios, the intra-EU 
trade share falls 13.1 percentage points. 
A similar effect is observed for processed rice, where EU imports from Uruguay 
account for only 0.4% in the benchmark. From this small base, the gravity scenario produces 
a further rise of 2.2 percentage points compared with the baseline, with much of this newly 
acquired market share diverted from the rest of the world (ROW). In dairy trade, this effect is 
even more striking. Benchmark EU import shares from Argentina, Brazil and Uruguay, 
account for 0.04%, 0.02% and 0.01%, respectively, whilst compared with the baseline the 
gravity scenario induces, a 21.6, 4.8 and 2.8 percentage point increases in the import shares 
for Argentina , Brazil and Uruguay, respectively). Accordingly, the intra-EU trade share falls 
a further 27.1 percentage points. 
In red and white meat markets, the benchmark data shows that Brazil already registers a 
small but steady presence, accounting for 7.2% and 4.6%, respectively, of EU imports. In the 
baseline, Brazil amasses a majority stake of EU red meat imports (74.3%), whilst its white 
meat trade share grows to a respectable 14.1%. Brazilian red meat trade shares increase a 
further 8.3 percentage points for red meat and 2.5 percentage points for white meat in the 
gravity scenario. Consequently, there are concomitant reductions in Argentinean, Uruguayan 
and intra-EU red meat trade shares (-1.2, -1.0 and -6.4 percentage points, respectively), whilst 
                                                 
19 The EU operates a prohibitive TRQ system of preferences for imports of sugar. As a large producer, Brazil is 
not afforded preferential treatment under the ACP scheme, although its trade share is steadily rising in the 
absence of the EU-Mercosur agreement owing to trade preference erosion due to the reduction of the EU’s 
guaranteed prices under the auspices of the sugar reforms. 
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the intra-EU white meat share falls a further two percentage points. In Paraguay, although the 
percentage point increase (0.64) in red meat trade share is not as visible, in relative terms this 
represents a significant import trade share gain when we considered next to its benchmark 
value (0.04%). 
In terms of Mercosur’s import shares (Table 4 – right panel), non agro-food imports 
from the EU record further gains compared with the baseline scenario, on account of 
Mercosur’s higher tariff protection. Perhaps surprisingly, the EU’s agro-food trade share also 
rises because of significant applied tariff protection levied by Mercosur on the aggregate 
sectors ‘beverages and tobacco’ and ‘other food’ processing. With the addition of gravity 
effects, the largest increases in EU trade shares occur in textiles (8.1 percentage points), 
whilst agro-food, light and heavy manufacturing record percentage point increases of 
approximately 2.5. Overall, Mercosur imports from the EU rise a further 9.4 per cent, due to 
agro-food (small base) and non agro-food increases of 20.2 per cent and 9.1 per cent (results 
not shown). 
Translating these additional trade led impacts into euro values, Table 5 shows an 
additional EU trade revenues decline of €10,328 million for agro-food products, with losses 
mainly accruing in dairy (€7,493 million), red meat (€3,405 million) and processed sugar 
(€1,422 million). This agro-food loss is compensated by gains in non agro-food trade 
(€10,279 million), which mainly accrues to heavy- (€5,222 million) and light-manufacturing 
(€2,508 million). As expected, the two largest Mercosur partners (Argentina and Brazil) enjoy 
the biggest agro-food trade revenue gains. With important trade balance improvements in red 
meat, dairy and sugar, Brazil realises an improvement in agro-food trade revenues of €5,558 
million, whilst Argentina’s corresponding statistic of €4,003 million is due to sizeable gains 
in its dairy sector. Paraguay realises its largest trade revenue gains in red meat (€169 million) 
and sugar (€143 million), whilst in Uruguay, there are important gains of €767 million.   
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Table 6 presents the impacts on resource reallocation, output and prices compared with 
the baseline. In the Mercosur regions, addition ‘gravity’ effects fuel further macro growth 
(particularly in Uruguay) and corresponding demand pull inflationary impacts on factor 
prices. Land prices rise a further 29.1 per cent and 14.6 per cent in Uruguay and Argentina, 
respectively, whilst in Brazil and Paraguay increases of between eight and ten per cent are 
estimated. Consequently, market prices in these regions rise, with a retail price index increase 
of up to seven per cent in Uruguay. With healthy expansions in sugar, meat, and dairy 
activities, agro-food output in all Mercosur regions rises between 3.3 per cent in Brazil (from 
a large base) and 9.3 per cent in Uruguay (due to a large expansion in its dairy sector). This 
further resource reallocation leads to contractions in textile and manufacturing activities, 
which in percentage terms, are particularly marked in Uruguay and Argentina. In the EU, red 
meat, sugar and dairy activities contract significantly (with repercussions in upstream sectors) 
resulting in a 2.1 per cent fall in EU agro-food output and a fall in the land price of 2.1 per 
cent. In the non agro-food sectors where the EU maintains a competitive trade advantage, 
additional gravity shocks result in a (slight) output rises (from large bases) in textiles, light- 
and heavy-manufacturing sectors. 
Examining the welfare impacts (Table 5 – lower panel), per capita real incomes increase 
further in Uruguay (5.8 per cent), Paraguay (3.1 per cent), Argentina (2.6 per cent) and Brazil 
(1.0 per cent), whilst in the EU the change is negligible. In monetary (equivalent variation) 
terms, the gains in Mercosur are largely due to the terms of trade (ToT) improvement owing 
to real exchange rate increases.20 In the EU, allocative efficiency gains of €7,062 million are 
largely explained by contractions in (subsidised) agro food activity. Moreover, additional EU 
trade facilitation gains (€5,053 million) are due to the technological Armington shifters, 
                                                 
20 For a full discussion of EV welfare decomposition in GTAP, see McDougall (2003). 
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particularly in meat, sugar and dairy imports from Mercosur.21 In Mercosur, trade facilitation 
gains (principally textile, light- and heavy-manufacturing imports) are smaller due to lower 
benchmark applied tariffs in the Mercosur regions.  
5. Conclusions  
This study employs a quantitative framework to re-assess the potential trade-led gains 
from an EU-Mercosur agreement. With the widespread usage of neoclassical multi-region 
computable general equilibrium (CGE) ex-ante trade liberalisation assessments, a key 
methodological focus examines the estimation and correction of well known trade creation 
bias on small import shares which arises from the Armington import specification. As a 
remedial measure, the study follows Kuiper and van Tongeren (2006). More specifically a 
gravity specification is employed to estimate the trade restrictiveness of tariff parameters on a 
sector-by-sector basis. The novelty of the research relates to use of count models with panel 
data, whilst the sectoral coverage of the study is extended to include all 56 tradable agro-food 
and non agro-food sectors. It is hoped that other modellers may also be able to employ these 
estimates to their own aggregations in an attempt to eliminate this important source of bias 
Comparing with Kuiper and van Tongeren (2006), the econometric results show a 
promising improvement in the statistical significance and consistency of the (tariff) parameter 
estimates with respect to a priori expectations across all of the sectors considered. In the 
second phase of this research, a baseline EU-Mercosur tariff elimination scenario is run 
employing a modified variant of the GTAP CGE model, , which in consonance with other 
CGE studies, yields real GDP gains to the Mercosur regions and to a lesser extent, the EU. In 
a further experiment, gravity simulations are run to ascertain the impact of a full tariff 
liberalisation between the EU and Mercosur on their respective import trade shares, which are 
subsequently employed to calculate ‘technological’ preference shifters in the CGE Armington 
                                                 
21 Given the ‘technological improvement’ in import composition, this registers as an additional real income gain 
via increases in imports (quantity effect) and a lower effective prices (price effect). 
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functions. Comparing with the baseline, traditionally small Mercosur exports enjoy notable 
EU market penetration. More specifically, owing to its high tariff barriers, EU imports of 
meat, dairy, sugar and rice from the Mercosur regions grows significantly, whilst the largest 
third country trade diversion effects occur on sugar trade.  
As a caveat of this research, the size of the additional gravity induced gains are 
exaggerated due to the assumption of full liberalisation, although if/when the agreement 
draws to its conclusion it will be possible to calculate gravity shifters consistent with the final 
agreed tariff offers on sensitive product lines. Moreover, the CGE generated welfare gains in 
our baseline are understated, particularly for the EU, since we do not account for the removal 
of non-tariff barriers in services sectors nor imperfect competition. Notwithstanding, the 
incremental welfare gains on commodity trade owing to gravity induced technology shifters 
should be largely considered as an independent ‘additive’ component to the existing CGE 
model drivers. That is, the magnitude of marginal trade impacts owing to gravity predictions 
should remain relatively unaffected.   
6. Acknowledgements 
The authors would like to thank the Instituto Nacional de Investigación y Tecnología 
Agraria y Alimentaria (INIA) (RTA2009-00107-00-00) and Defra (UK) for providing 
financial assistance for this research. 
6. ReferencesAlston, J.M., Carter, C.A., Green, R. and Pick, D. (1990). Whither 
Armington Trade Models?, American Journal of Agricultural Economics, 72, pp455-467. 
Armington P. (1969) A theory of demand for products distinguished by place of 
production. IMF Staff Papers, 16, 159-176. 
Arnon A. and Weinblatt J. (1998). Linder's hypothesis revisited: income similarity 
effects for low income countries. Applied Economic Letters 5, 607-611. 
 21
Boadway, R. and Treddenick, J.M. (1978) A General Equilibrium Computation of the 
Effects of the Canadian Tariff Structure, Canadian Journal of Economics, 11 (3), 424-446. 
Brown, D.K. (1987) Tariffs, the Terms of Trade and National Product Differentiation, 
Journal of Policy Modelling, 9 (3), 503-526. 
Burger, M., van Oort, F., G.J. Linders, 2009. On the specification of the gravity model 
of trade: zeros, excess zeros and zero-inflated estimation, Spatial Economic Analysis, 4(2), 
167-190. 
Burrell, A. (ed) (2011) Potentuial EU-Mercosur Free Trade Agreement: Impact 
Assessment, JRC referente reports, IPTS, European Commission. 
De Frahan, B. and Vancauteren, M. (2006) Harmonisation of food regulations and trade 
in the single market: evidence from disaggregated data, European Review of Agricultural 
Economics, 33(3), pp337-360. 
Diao, X., E. Diaz-Bonilla and S. Robinson (2003), ‘Scenarios for Trade Integration in 
the Americas’, Economie Internationale, 94-95, 33-52. 
Feenstra, R.C. (2004). Advanced International Trade: Theory and Evidence, Princeton 
University Press. 
Foster N., Poeschl J. and Stehrer R. (2011). The impact of Preferential Trade 
Agreements on the margins of international trade. Economic Systems, 35, 84-97. 
Francois, J.F., B. McDonald and H. Nordstrom (1996), ‘Liberalisation and Capital 
Accumulation in the GTAP Model’, Technical paper 7, GTAP technical paper series 
http://www.gtap.agecon.purdue.edu/resources/download/40.pdf 
Frankel J. (1997). Regional tading blocs in the world economic system. Institute for 
International Economics, Washington D.C. 
Gourieroux C., Monfort A. and Trognon A. (1984). Pseudo Maximum Likelihood 
Methods: Applications to Poisson models. Econometrica 52, 701-720. 
 22
Hallack J.C. (2010). A product-quality view of the Linder hypothesis. The Review of 
Economics and Statistics 92(3), 453-466. 
Hayakawa K. and Yamashita N. (2011). The role of preferential trade agreements 
(PTAs) in facilitating global production networks. Journal of World Trade, 45(6), 1181-1207. 
Hertel, T.W. (ed.), (1997) Global Trade Analysis: Modelling and Applications, 
Cambridge University Press. 
Kandogan Y. (2008). Consistent estimates of regional blocs' trade effects. Review of 
International Economics, 16(2), 301-314. 
Keeney, R. and Hertel, T.W. (2005) GTAP-AGR: A framework for assessing the 
implications of multilateral changes in agricultural policies. GTAP technical paper 24, Purdue 
University, https://www.gtap.agecon.purdue.edu/resources/download/2310.pdf 
Kirkpatrick, C. and George, C. (2009). Trade Sustainability Impact Assessment of the 
association agreement under negotiation between the European Community and Mercosur. 
Final Report (March 2009) carried out for the European Commission http://www.sia-
trade.org/mercosur 
Komorovska, J., Kuiper M. and van Tongeren F. (2006) Sharing Gravity: Gravity 
Estimates of Trade Shares in Agri-Food. Tenth Annual Conference on global Economic 
Analysis, Purdue University, West Lafayette, 7-9 June, 2007. 
Martínez-Zarzoso I., Felicitas N.L.D. and Horsewood N. (2009). Are regional trading 
agreements beneficial? Static and dynamic panel gravity models. North American Journal of 
Economics and Finance 20(1), 46-65. 
McDougall, R. (2003) A New Regional Household Demand System for GTAP, GTAP 
technical paper 20, Purdue University,  
https://www.gtap.agecon.purdue.edu/resources(res_display.asp?RecordID=942 
 23
Melitz J. (2007). North, South and distance in the gravity model. European Economic 
Review 51, 971-991. 
Morkre, M.E. and Tarr, D.G. (1993) Reforming Hungarian Agricultural Trade Policy - 
A Quantitative Evaluation, World Bank Discussion Paper, Sept '93, WPS 1185. 
Santos Silva J.M.C. and Tenreyro S. (2006). The log of gravity. The Review of 
Economics and Statistics 88, 641-658. 
Santos Silva J.M.C. and Tenreyro S. (2011). Further simulation evidence on the 
performance of the Poisson pseudo-maximum likelihood estimator. Economics Letters 112, 
220-222. 
Wang, C., Wei, Y. and Liu, X. (2010). Determinants of bilateral trade flows in OECD 
countries: Evidence from gravity panel data models, The World Economy, 33(7), 894-915. 
Winters, L.A. (1984) Separability and the Specification of Foreign Trade Functions, 
Journal of International Economics, 17, pp239-263. 
Woolridge J.M. (2002). Econometric Analysis of Cross Section and Panel Data. Boston, 
MIT Press. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 24
Table 1: Description of the 56 sectors and accompanying codes 
 
Sector code Full description Sector code Full description 
pdr Paddy rice lea Leather products 
wht Wheat lum Wood products 
gro Other cereal grains ppp Paper products, publishing 
v_f Vegetables, fruits and nuts p_c Petroleum, coal products 
osd Oilseeds crp Chemical, rubbwer, plastic products 
c_b Raw sugar nmm Other mineral products  
pfb Plant based fibers i_s Ferrous metals 
ocr Other Crops nfm Non ferrous metals 
ctl Cattle fmp Metal products 
oap Other animal products mvh Motor vehicles and parts 
rmk Raw milk otn Other transport equipment 
wol Wool and silk-worm cocoons ele Electronic equipment 
frs Forestry ome Other machinery and equipment 
fsh Fishing omf Other manufacturing activity 
coa Coal ely Electricity 
oil Oil gdt Gas manufacture and distribution 
gas Gas wtr Water 
omn Other minerals cns Construction 
cmt Bovine meat trd Trade 
omt Other meat products otp Other transport 
vol Vegetable oils and fats wtp Water transport 
mil Dairy products atp Air transport 
pcr Processed rice cmn Communication 
sgr Sugar ofi Financial services 
ofd Other food products isr Insurance 
b_t Beverages and tobacco products obs Other business services 
tex Textiles ros Recreational and other services 
wap Wearing apparel osg Public administration, defense, education, health 
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Table 2: Variable descriptions in the gravity equation 
Variable Description 
Xijt Value of imports into country j from country i at world prices in year t 
Mtijt Power of the import tariff rate (AdvRateijt) applied by importer j on imports from i in year t, 
measured in ad-valorem equivalents, in logs: 
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ +=
100
AdvRate
1lnMt ijtijt  
Xsijt Power of the export subsidy rate (XSubRateijt) applied by country i on exports to country j in 
year t, in logs: 
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ +=
100
XSubRate
1lnXs ijtijt  
Distij Great circle distance between the capitals of country i and j, in logs 
NoSoij Difference in latitudes between countries i and j, in logs: ln(latitudei – latitudej) 
Remoteit Indicator of remoteness of country i in year t, calculated as a GDP weighted average of 
distance to the rest of countries/regions: 
⎟⎟
⎟
⎠
⎞
⎜⎜
⎜
⎝
⎛
×−= ∑
T(i)
j
ij
itWt
jt
it DistGDPGDP
GDP
lnRemote  
where Distij is the distance between i and j (defined as above), GDPWt is the world GDP in 
year t, and T(i) is the number of (possible) destination countries of exports from i which is 95 
when i is a composite region, and 94 when i is an individual country. 
Contigij Dummy variable that values 1 when countries i and j share a border, and 0 otherwise 
Langij Dummy variable that values 1 when countries i and j share the same official language, and 0 
otherwise; 
 
Colijt Dummy variable that values 1 when countries i and j have or have had a colonial linkage 
PTAij Dummy variable that values 1 when countries i and j have belonged to the same Preferential   
Trade Area, at least from 2001. PTA includes EU, NAFTA, Mercosur (Southern Cone 
Common Market), Andean Pact, Caricom (Caribbean Community and Common Market) and 
CACM (Central American Common Market) 
Sqincomeijt Square of the difference in per capita income in countries i and j, in logs: ln((GDPpcit – 
GDPpcjt)2) with GDPpc measured in US$ per habitant  (in nominal terms) 
Gdpijt  Product of GDP in country i and country j in year t, in logs: ln(GDPit × GDPjt), with GDP 
measured in million US $ (in nominal terms) 
Y2004t Dummy variable that values 1 when the year t is 2004 
Fi (Fj) Fixed effects for exporter (importer) country i (j). Fi(Fj) are dummy variables, that value 1 
when the exporter (importer) is i (j), and 0 otherwise 
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Table 3. Estimated parameters of the gravity equation 
Sector code Mt Xs Dist NoSo Remote Contig Lang Col PTA Sqincome Constant MODEL LR e Vuong Test f
coef -0.201 . -0.553 -0.002 5.867 0.340 -0.023 0.479 1.072 0.044 -71.159 1987.0 0.630  pdr p-value 0.047 . 0.000 0.962 0.001 0.009 0.785 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 NB 0.000 0.264 
wht coef -0.855 3.788 -1.568 0.018 3.553 0.109 -0.058 0.931 1.514 -0.015 -43.101 34126.9 2.280 
 p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.012 0.000 0.000 0.010 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 ZIP 0.000 0.011 
gro coef -0.810 2.755 -1.810 0.058 3.531 0.192 0.245 0.343 0.895 0.002 -47.076 n.a. n.a. 
 p-value 0.013 0.004 0.000 0.160 0.185 0.250 0.111 0.186 0.000 0.904 0.044 ZINB n.a. n.a. 
v_f coef -0.949 2.675 -1.056 0.130 3.001 0.948 -0.040 0.391 0.310 0.004 -38.361 1.398 0.210 
 p-value 0.000 0.014 0.000 0.000 0.013 0.000 0.588 0.000 0.011 0.651 0.000 NB 0.237 0.419 
osd coef -0.082 . -1.316 -0.196 7.218 0.722 0.674 0.252 0.207 0.041 -80.992 n.a. n.a. 
 p-value 0.887 . 0.000 0.000 0.029 0.000 0.000 0.307 0.418 0.109 0.005 ZINB n.a.  n.a. 
c_b coef -1.011 . -1.576 0.532 -9.995 2.164 0.593 0.550 -0.053 0.107 48.516 23.6 -0.500 
 p-value 0.126 . 0.000 0.043 0.441 0.033 0.118 0.446 0.962 0.110 0.000 NB 0.000 0.691 
pfb coef -4.937 0.662 -0.494 -0.010 5.009 0.486 -0.126 0.195 0.430 0.039 -75.040 11333.9 0.700 
 p-value 0.000 0.850 0.000 0.722 0.000 0.000 0.085 0.095 0.003 0.000 0.000 NB 0.000 0.243 
ocr coef -0.341 . -0.928 0.083 2.483 0.259 -0.125 0.140 -0.153 0.005 -35.950 14.1 2.060 
 p-value 0.050 . 0.000 0.002 0.092 0.003 0.139 0.204 0.103 0.549 0.005 ZIP 0.000 0.020 
ctl coef -1.010 2.403 -1.644 0.039 2.379 1.249 -0.201 0.621 -0.346 -0.058 -34.002 11987.4 -2.780 
 p-value 0.025 0.044 0.000 0.332 0.275 0.000 0.073 0.001 0.029 0.000 0.075 ZINB 0.000 0.997 
oap coef -1.068 . -0.528 -0.068 2.213 0.882 0.002 0.223 0.676 0.051 -36.158 14475.3 -2.490 
 p-value 0.000 . 0.000 0.019 0.081 0.000 0.968 0.004 0.000 0.000 0.001 NB 0.000 0.994 
rmk coef . 0.438 -0.497 0.015 -16.857 0.441 0.009 0.175 0.520 0.001 90.021 0.001 -0.600 
 p-value . 0.352 0.004 0.835 0.049 0.107 0.973 0.537 0.189 0.992 0.000 POISSON 1.000 0.727 
wol coef -8.859 . -0.716 0.128 -12.139 0.374 0.096 0.447 0.196 -0.026 86.943 0.000 n.a. 
 p-value 0.000 . 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.027 0.396 0.051 0.344 0.052 0.000 POISSON 1.000 n.a. 
cmt coef -0.415 -0.016 -1.265 0.026 2.092 0.665 0.060 0.802 0.752 0.007 -32.895 46177.8 1.220 
 p-value 0.013 0.946 0.000 0.397 0.173 0.000 0.516 0.000 0.000 0.563 0.015 ZINB 0.000 0.110 
omt coef -0.832 0.733 -1.071 -0.011 5.502 0.772 0.294 0.497 0.695 -0.017 -63.297 n.a. n.a. 
 p-value 0.004 0.756 0.000 0.735 0.006 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.151 0.000 NB n.a. n.a. 
vol coef -0.718 2.098 -0.579 0.012 6.900 0.496 0.174 0.190 0.144 0.007 -75.774 71683.7 2.810 
 p-value 0.000 0.122 0.000 0.438 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.002 0.088 0.133 0.000 NB 0.000 0.002 
mil coef -1.931 0.080 -1.069 0.016 -0.567 0.417 0.376 0.639 0.680 -0.025 -33.53 39228.5 0.210 
 p-value 0.000 0.381 0.000 0.001 0.027 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 POISSON 0.000 0.410 
pcr coef -0.297 0.182 -0.443 -0.043 3.056 0.389 0.005 0.233 0.603 0.012 -45.064 7707.0 -1.800 
 p-value 0.000 0.383 0.000 0.102 0.000 0.000 0.930 0.001 0.000 0.056 0.000 NB 0.000 0.960 
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Sector code Mt Xs Dist NoSo Remote Contig Lang Col PTA Sqincome Constant MODEL LR e Vuong Test f
coef -0.521 0.533 -1.305 0.126 1.466 0.533 0.260 0.156 -0.407 0.027 -39.592 37917.8 -0.530 sgr p-value 0.000 0.149 0.000 0.000 0.309 0.000 0.000 0.143 0.006 0.010 0.951 NB 0.000 0.702 
ofd coef -0.736 2.725 -0.724 0.027 1.315 0.627 0.117 0.310 0.695 0.020 -25.461 156273.8 0.500 
 p-value 0.000 0.016 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 NB 0.000 0.308 
b_t coef -0.825 -9.560 -1.012 0.173 2.963 0.234 0.281 0.621 0.187 -0.035 -40.232 101452.1 -0.740 
 p-value 0.010 0.567 0.000 0.000 0.158 0.095 0.002 0.000 0.225 0.008 0.029 POISSON 0.000 0.769 
frs coef -0.917 . -0.487 0.044 3.823 0.805 0.025 0.349 0.233 0.023 -50.224 10388.060 1.390 
 p-value 0.000 . 0.000 0.003 0.000 0.000 0.611 0.000 0.046 0.000 0.000 NB 0.000 0.082 
fsh coef -1.068 . -1.427 -0.073 9.164 0.453 0.204 0.331 0.313 0.009 -95.772 7599.920 n.a. 
 p-value 0.000 . 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.020 0.000 POISSON 0.000 n.a. 
coa coef -8.909 7.582 -2.299 0.232 1.300 0.679 -0.320 0.703 -1.413 0.030 -26.840 33912.442 1.560 
 p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.307 POISSON 0.000 0.059 
oil coef -0.994 1.876 -2.182 0.002 1.135 0.009 0.459 0.914 0.868 -0.022 -30.550 723212.120 2.670 
 p-value 0.272 0.199 0.000 0.956 0.659 0.959 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.203 0.175 ZINB 0.000 0.004 
gas coef -8.701 0.524 -0.823 -0.196 -10.502 1.253 0.090 0.582 0.575 0.009 56.213 216126.020 -1.420 
 p-value 0.061 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.554 0.003 0.018 0.627 . NB 0.000 0.922 
omn coef -6.433 6.003 -0.860 0.131 -6.735 0.787 0.110 1.196 -0.336 0.048 41.850 191451.040 3.780 
 p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 ZIP 0.000 0.000 
tex coef -1.866 2.628 -1.129 0.049 4.368 0.280 0.335 0.078 0.329 0.132 -52.164 187455.530 0.980 
 p-value 0.008 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.520 0.000 0.000 0.000 POISSON 0.000 0.164 
wap coef -1.381 1.836 -1.216 0.095 2.465 0.502 0.422 0.198 -0.128 0.146 -34.094 155778.470 1.030 
 p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 POISSON 0.000 0.152 
lea coef -2.639 4.789 -0.635 -0.096 1.463 0.458 0.209 0.397 0.277 0.113 -27.967 105557.600 0.530 
 p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 POISSON 0.000 0.297 
lum coef -0.972 1.264 -0.674 0.002 2.599 0.864 0.100 0.182 0.582 0.044 -36.721 114741.310 n.a. 
 p-value 0.000 0.009 0.000 0.850 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 NB 0.000 n.a. 
ppp coef -0.890 2.828 -0.797 0.063 1.711 0.683 0.173 0.232 0.698 -0.012 -28.151 98226.006 -1.250 
 p-value 0.008 0.049 0.000 0.000 0.164 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.021 0.009 NB 0.000 0.894 
p_c coef -2.417 3.296 -2.026 0.048 -1.813 1.052 0.079 0.422 -0.524 0.039 3.509 234.794 n.a. 
 p-value 0.002 0.126 0.000 0.288 0.636 0.000 0.550 0.006 0.017 0.070 0.917 ZINB 0.000 n.a. 
crp coef -1.525 1.653 -0.738 0.032 3.199 0.308 0.026 0.194 0.463 -0.033 -40.615 574431.880 -0.350 
 p-value 0.000 0.002 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.160 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 NB 0.000 0.636 
nmm coef -1.094 2.038 -0.812 -0.019 2.230 0.647 0.035 0.242 0.226 0.006 -32.531 77011.662 -0.530 
 p-value 0.000 0.045 0.000 0.005 0.000 0.000 0.125 0.000 0.000 0.021 0.000 NB 0.000 0.701 
i_s coef -0.786 3.457 -0.939 0.022 5.263 0.494 0.159 0.345 0.509 0.008 -58.922 175053.690 -0.620 
 p-value 0.001 0.026 0.000 0.011 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.016 0.000 NB 0.000 0.731 
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.../... 
Sector code Mt Xs Dist NoSo Remote Contig Lang Col PTA Sqincome Constant MODEL LR e Vuong Test f
coef -8.910 11.086 -0.879 0.020 3.819 0.286 0.129 0.442 0.800 0.059 -49.231 329344.760 6.300 nfm p-value 0.000 0.049 0.000 0.512 0.013 0.002 0.224 0.003 0.000 0.000 0.000 ZIP 0.000 0.000 
fmp coef -1.649 3.817 -1.620 -0.051 2.734 0.673 0.541 1.085 0.003 -0.034 -34.267 76.488 2.580 
 p-value 0.014 0.539 0.000 0.034 0.107 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.985 0.001 0.022 ZINB 0.000 0.005 
mvh coef -0.636 3.402 -0.785 -0.031 4.520 0.457 0.123 0.208 0.779 -0.013 -53.357 89.574 -0.670   
 p-value 0.000 0.105 0.000 0.057 0.000 0.000 0.006 0.035 0.000 0.051 0.000 NB 0.000 0.750 
otn coef -0.504 -0.364 -0.383 0.009 2.521 0.524 -0.088 0.458 0.038 -0.043 -38.434 405444.810 -0.240 
 p-value 0.024 0.671 0.000 0.562 0.013 0.000 0.084 0.000 0.712 0.000 0.000 NB 0.000 0.596 
ele coef -0.978 2.911 -0.598 0.041 4.463 0.184 0.055 0.158 0.435 0.014 -52.539 594653.070 -1.430 
 p-value 0.007 0.000 0.000 0.145 0.000 0.025 0.318 0.020 0.000 0.076 0.000 NB 0.000 0.924 
ome coef -1.453 3.633 -1.084 -0.043 3.976 0.313 0.224 0.375 -0.062 -0.013 -47.551 84.374 n.a. 
 p-value 0.006 0.310 0.000 0.007 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.493 0.083 0.000 NB 0.000 n.a. 
omf coef -0.446 1.784 -0.955 -0.018 0.776 0.636 0.467 1.137 -0.185 0.029 -23.532 214377.990 1.450 
 p-value 0.038 0.400 0.000 0.290 0.414 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.010 0.000 0.005 ZINB 0.000 0.074 
ely coef 2.161 . -0.618 -0.036 6.925 1.958 0.057 -0.011 -0.001 -0.010 -77.989 n.a n.a. 
 p-value 0.203 . 0.000 0.323 0.003 0.000 0.538 0.943 0.996 0.470 0.000 NB n.a n.a. 
gdt coef -1.418 . -0.004 -0.073 -7.706 -0.131 0.527 -0.389 0.122 -0.022 18.150 2884.790 -1.530 
 p-value 0.792 . 0.985 0.411 0.090 0.731 0.055 0.446 0.747 0.383 . POISSON 0.000 0.937 
wtr coef . . -0.163 0.004 -1.699 0.283 0.056 0.226 0.363 0.034 -10.390 0.000 1.210 
 p-value . . 0.000 0.850 0.197 0.002 0.345 0.018 0.000 0.000 0.366 POISSON 1.000 0.113 
cns coef . . -0.029 -0.027 1.834 0.240 0.091 0.032 0.398 -0.012 -37.121 6914.372 -0.020 
 p-value . . 0.247 0.101 0.165 0.001 0.121 0.676 0.000 0.103 0.001 NB 0.000 0.509 
trd coef . . -0.203 0.082 3.956 0.386 0.196 0.065 0.365 0.002 -51.768 82585.976 1.090 
 p-value . . 0.000 0.002 0.000 0.032 0.038 0.561 0.000 0.782 0.000 NB 0.000 0.138 
otp coef . . -0.014 -0.016 1.589 0.152 -0.077 0.042 0.348 -0.012 -32.113 72517.956 0.750 
 p-value . . 0.528 0.293 0.117 0.034 0.131 0.643 0.000 0.041 0.000 NB 0.000 0.228 
wtp coef . . -0.048 -0.015 0.002 0.297 -0.052 0.196 0.143 0.012 -22.201 36922.3 1.850 
 p-value . . 0.016 0.202 0.997 0.000 0.147 0.001 0.010 0.003 0.000 ZINB 0.000 0.032 
atp coef . . -0.074 -0.001 -3.092 0.321 -0.020 0.170 0.116 0.007 5.688 47619.378 2.040 
 p-value . . 0.000 0.908 0.000 0.000 0.442 0.001 0.015 0.018 0.132 ZINB 0.000 0.021 
cmn coef . . -0.148 -0.005 -2.880 0.274 -0.009 0.202 0.187 0.020 4.745 16874.982 9.570 
 p-value . . 0.000 0.690 0.000 0.000 0.766 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.269 ZINB 0.000 0.000 
ofi coef . . -0.131 -0.019 1.119 0.468 -0.038 0.073 0.057 0.001 -33.139 n.a 2.070 
 p-value . . 0.000 0.171 0.110 0.000 0.329 0.273 0.368 0.776 0.000 
ZINB n.a 0.019 
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Sector code Mt Xs Dist NoSo Remote Contig Lang Col PTA Sqincome Constant MODEL LR d Vuong Test  
coef . . -0.124 0.003 -5.980 0.219 0.024 0.165 0.232 0.015 29.944 n.a 1.860 isr 
 p-value . . 0.000 0.820 0.000 0.003 0.452 0.017 0.000 0.001 0.000 ZINB n.a 0.032 
obs coef . . -0.036 -0.007 -1.536 0.200 -0.003 0.135 0.490 -0.030 -4.633 153907.590 1.090 
 p-value . . 0.057 0.683 0.169 0.004 0.954 0.113 0.000 0.000 0.636 NB 0.000 0.137 
ros coef . . -0.075 0.005 3.805 0.140 0.003 0.270 0.569 -0.013 -52.564 29189.122 1.060 
 p-value . . 0.001 0.770 0.003 0.087 0.953 0.005 0.000 0.025 0.000 NB 0.000 0.144 
osg coef . . -0.081 0.018 1.724 0.221 -0.050 0.130 0.282 -0.016 -33.833 28237.708 1.520 
 p-value . . 0.001 0.322 0.210 0.007 0.291 0.160 0.003 0.042 0.005 NB 0.000 0.064 
Impact  
on 
Trade 
Median c -0.917 0.894 -0.762 0.000 1.308 57.62% 0.00% 25.73% 34.46% 0.000     
a Results for the year, country-specific fixed effects, and explanatory variables in the state of zero inflated probability, are not reported for space saving reasons. 
b n.a indicates that one of the models involved in the comparison test failed to converge. 
c Median (across sectors) of percentage change in expected value of bilateral trade following 1% change in the explanatory variable or elasticity (in continuous variables); and the median of the 
sectorial percentage change in expected value of bilateral trade when the dummy variable equals 1: [ ]1)exp(*100 −jβ . Non-significant (at 10%) coefficients are replaced by zero in the 
computation. 
d The Log-likelihood ratio tests for the significance of the dispersion parameter. It compares either of the pairs NB vs. Poisson, or ZINB vs. ZIP, depending on the reported variant in the column 
‘MODEL’. When the LR statistic is not available due to convergence problems, the confidence interval is used instead as a guideline to verify if the dispersion parameter is greater than zero. The 
dispersion parameter (respective confidence intervals) for ‘gro’, ‘osd’, ‘omt’, ‘ofi’ and ‘isr’  are: 0.838 (0.707, 0.994), 0.799 (0.661, 0.965), 2.446 (2.404, 2.489), 0.381 (0.287, 0.505) and 0.225 
(0.152, 0.331) .  In sector ‘ely’, the dispersion parameter was neither available. 
eThe Vuong statistic. The test compares either of the pairs ZIP vs. Poisson, or ZINB vs. NB, depending on the reported variant in the column ‘MODEL’
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Table 4: Import trade shares for the benchmark data, baseline and gravity scenarios (calculated at c.i.f. prices) 
 European Union import shares (%) 
 (including intra-EU trade) 
 Mercosur import shares (%) 
(including intra-Mercosur trade) 
 EU Argentina Brazil Paraguay Uruguay ROW  EU Mercosur ROW 
Benchmark: Benchmark:    
Red meat 73.84 4.22 7.16 0.04 1.08 13.67 Agro-food 14.18 60.36 25.46 
White meat 88.69 0.57 4.60 0.00 0.07 6.07 Textiles 14.45 23.94 61.61 
Dairy 94.65 0.04 0.02 0.00 0.01 5.28 Light manufacturing 29.73 26.80 43.47 
Processed rice 56.32 0.01 0.11 0.00 0.39 43.17 Heavy manufacturing 27.77 15.21 57.02 
Processed sugar 57.97 0.02 2.61 0.13 0.00 39.27     
Baseline: Baseline:    
Red meat 20.06 1.79 74.33 1.41 2.02 0.39 Agro-food 21.45 53.76 24.79 
White meat 80.70 2.63 14.07 0.00 0.30 2.29 Textiles 35.84 16.48 47.68 
Dairy 93.77 2.56 0.48 0.07 0.52 2.60 Light manufacturing 49.67 18.32 32.02 
Processed rice 51.78 0.00 0.10 0.00 11.98 36.14 Heavy manufacturing 44.36 11.52 44.11 
Processed sugar 36.70 0.04 47.05 4.08 0.00 12.13     
Gravity: Gravity:    
Red meat 13.62 0.57 82.62 2.05 0.98 0.16 Agro-food 24.04 50.42 25.54 
White meat 78.65 2.64 16.56 0.00 0.33 1.83 Textiles 43.98 13.21 42.82 
Dairy 66.68 24.16 5.28 0.00 3.31 0.56 Light manufacturing 51.95 16.62 31.43 
Processed rice 50.94 0.00 0.09 0.00 14.19 34.78 Heavy manufacturing 46.54 10.40 43.07 
Processed sugar 23.61 0.02 66.09 5.73 0.00 4.55     
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Table 5: Impacts on trade balances and regional welfare (€ millions, 2004 prices) 
Trade balance impacts: 
 Benchmark (2004) trade balance Gravity scenario vs. Baseline trade balance change 
 EU Argentina Brazil Paraguay Uruguay EU Argentina Brazil Paraguay Uruguay 
Red meat -1,707 811 1,674 98 489 -3,405 -362 3,478 169 -254 
White meat 1,404 195 3,419 1 19 -272 -39 281 -1 3 
Dairy 3,812 393 3 -7 133 -7,493 6,071 1,383 -16 767 
Processed sugar -878 51 2,260 17 -15 -1,422 -11 1,517 143 -3 
Textiles -42,132 -273 111 -52 98 689 -92 -226 -16 -58 
Light manufacturing 32,683 -935 13,707 -262 -4 2,508 -884 -1,584 -40 -139 
Heavy manufacturing 22,429 -4,204 -5,380 -1,768 -1,166 5,222 -1,357 -2,477 -93 -150 
Agro-food -28,975 13,057 20,476 1,292 775 -10,328 4,003 5,558 250 462 
Non agro-food -16,817 -3,046 6,656 -676 -1,197 10,279 -3,340 -5,141 -213 -512 
Total -45,792 10,011 27,132 616 -422 -49 663 417 37 -50 
Regional welfare analysis compared with the baseline: 
 EU Argentina Brazil Paraguay Uruguay ROW     
Per capita utility (%) 0.1 2.6 1.0 3.1 5.8 0.0     
Equivalent variation 8,925 2,893 4,752 200 617 4,716     
Allocative efficiency 7,062 526 932 33 123 1,056     
Terms of trade -3,738 1,174 1,451 90 231 669     
Trade facilitation 5,053 66 236 3 11 0     
Endowment effect 547 1,126 2,133 75 252 2,991     
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Table 6: Percentage changes in outputs and market prices compared with the baseline. 
 Employment and output Market price 
 EU Argentina Brazil Paraguay Uruguay EU Argentina Brazil Paraguay Uruguay 
Land 0.0 7.3 2.7 2.3 2.9 -1.0 14.6 8.4 9.5 29.1 
Unskilled labour 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.2 7.7 2.4 5.1 11.7 
Skilled labour 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.1 6.4 2.3 3.0 9.8 
Capital 0.0 3.7 1.9 3.1 7.0 -0.1 3.4 1.1 1.5 4.0 
Raw sugar -13.2 13.0 12.8 32.8 14.7 -2.0 9.4 4.7 13.5 7.6 
Raw milk -6.1 216.7 16.1 0.5 164.7 -2.1 28.2 5.6 4.5 35.9 
Cattle & Sheep -8.8 3.1 11.5 13.3 -24.2 -0.2 9.1 5.4 6.4 6.3 
Pigs & Poultry 0.3 -4.8 4.4 13.0 -15.8 -1.3 6.0 4.4 6.6 6.3 
Red Meat -22.4 -12.5 12.4 18.1 -31.1 -0.3 7.2 3.8 4.1 6.2 
White meat -0.2 -5.3 2.2 2.3 -2.8 -0.6 5.4 3.2 4.0 6.2 
Dairy -7.6 228.3 25.3 -12.5 176.8 -1.7 14.1 2.8 3.2 18.1 
Processed sugar -21.3 14.7 21.3 34.1 14.7 -0.7 6.9 2.5 7.7 4.7 
Textiles 0.4 -4.6 -1.2 -0.6 -14.7 -0.2 2.3 1.1 2.4 3.9 
Light manufacturing 0.2 -4.3 -2.0 -0.7 -12.5 -0.1 3.2 1.3 2.0 4.2 
Heavy manufacturing 0.3 -4.5 -1.7 -2.2 -6.0 -0.1 2.6 0.9 1.9 2.6 
Agro-food -2.1 7.6 3.3 4.7 9.3 -0.8 7.6 3.3 4.7 9.3 
Non agro-food 0.1 -0.1 0.0 0.1 0.4 -0.1 3.9 1.3 2.1 5.5 
Real growth 0.1 1.7 0.9 1.9 3.8      
Retail price index      -0.2 5.1 1.7 3.4 7.2 
Factor price index      -0.1 5.4 1.8 3.7 7.8 
 
 
 
 
